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S U M M A R Y
Fertility ends at similar ages in women and female chimpanzees, but
humans usually live longer and mature later. We also differ from our closest
living relatives in weaning infants before they can feed themselves. The com-
parisons pose questions about when and why the distinctively human life 
history traits evolved in our lineage. Here I outline the basic framework of 
the field of life history evolution and, against that background, chronicle past
inquiries into each of these distinctively human traits. The chronicle covers
discovery and description, guided sometimes by hypotheses about underlying
developmental mechanisms and sometimes by hypotheses about adaptive effects.
Following the review, I discuss the continuing importance of distinguishing
between questions about mechanisms and adaptive effects in light of accu-
mulating fossil evidence and progress in genomics. I conclude with a brief 
reference to the most influential adaptive hypothesis to date, the Hunting
hypothesis, and some of the accumulating empirical challenges to it, setting 
the stage for current debates addressed in subsequent chapters.
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Human life histories differ from those of our nearest living rela-
tives in several striking ways (Smith and Tompkins 1995; Bogin and
Smith 1996; Robson, van Schaik, and Hawkes, chapter 2, this volume).
We can live twice as long as chimpanzees can, having the greatest
potential longevity of the terrestrial vertebrates (Carey and Judge
2000). Yet, fertility declines to essentially zero at about the age of 45 
in both women and female chimpanzees (Gage 1998; Hawkes 2003;
Nishida et al. 2003). Other aspects of human physiology age more 
slowly than our ovarian systems (Gosden 1985; Finch 1990; Hill and
Hurtado 1991; Hughes et al. 2001; Blurton Jones and Marlowe 2002;
Walker and Hill 2003), so, unlike other primates, we reach menopause
before our geriatric years (Pavelka and Fedigan 1991). We mature very
slowly. Average age at first birth is about six years later for humans than
it is for chimpanzees (Robson, van Schaik, and Hawkes, chapter 2, this
volume). But we wean infants earlier than chimpanzees do and have
shorter birth spacing (Galdikas and Wood 1990; Robson, van Schaik,
and Hawkes, chapter 2, this volume). Unlike other primate juveniles,
our children continue to depend on feeding assistance after they are
weaned and their mothers are nursing new babies (Lancaster and
Lancaster 1983, 1987; Bogin 1999a).
These features of human life histories not only describe important
aspects of our individual lives but also determine the age structure of
human families, communities, and populations. Age composition of
social groups determines many of the problems and possibilities of both
conflict and cooperation. Accumulating evidence that our life history
features are both distinctive and typical of human experience prompts
questions about when and why they evolved. When and why did ances-
tral populations begin to have characteristically human age structures?
Modern humans are the only living representatives of a clade that
has included many other species. Those previous members of our lin-
eage and their distribution in time and space are known only through
the fossil and archaeological record. Without that record, we would
have no clues to the existence and distinctive character of either aus-
tralopithecines or any species in the genus Homo except our own. The
fragmentary evidence of hominin fossils and the archaeology associat-
ed with past populations are the key lines of evidence about how they
differed from one another, when and how much they differed from liv-
ing species, and when and why human life histories evolved.
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A focus on life histories highlights questions about longevity and
aging, age at maturity, rates of offspring production, and the popula-
tion age structures that these imply. Life history evolution is a field that
seeks to explain variation in probabilities of survival and reproduction
across the lifespans of living things, highlighting interrelationships
among these timing and rate variables. Questions about physiological
(and now, increasingly, molecular) mechanisms that underlie the rate
and timing of growth, development, reproduction, and aging occupy
many researchers. Life history evolution focuses less on mechanisms
and more on their fitness-related effects, that is, whether they are like-
ly to result in relatively more descendants in future populations. These
effects can explain why natural selection adjusts the timing and rate
variables (and therefore the mechanisms underlying them) differently
in different species. The goal of the field is to discover the fitness costs
and benefits, the trade-offs that explain the diversity of life histories
across the living world. Applied to our lineage, the theory, the models,
and other conceptual tools help link multiple lines of evidence about
our evolutionary heritage.
Following this introduction, I describe the field of life history evo-
lution by characterizing a few of its key assumptions and models (for a
review of the field, see Stearns 1992). In preparation for subsequent
discussion, I then summarize r and K selection, some critiques, and
Charnov’s alternative scheme of dimensionless invariants.
Next, I turn to the history of ideas and findings about the appear-
ance of four distinctive features of human life history: our late matu-
ration, our potentially long lifespans, our slow aging, with fertility
ending in women while other physiological systems maintain a sub-
stantial fraction of peak performance, and our children’s continued
dependence on feeding assistance after they are weaned.
After summarizing work on the evolution of each of those four 
features, I explicitly distinguish different kinds of explanations. The 
discussion follows the review of work because a different mix of
explanatory frameworks has influenced inquiry into each of the four
features of human life histories. Questions about causal mechanisms
and about adaptive function have both been important. Distinguish-
ing between them is too. Another distinction, between homologous
features (those shared with immediate common ancestors) and homo-
plasies (similarities that newly appear in descendants), has also become
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especially important with the rise of cladistics and the explosive devel-
opment of molecular techniques. The distinction between homologies
and homoplasies is of primary import for investigators seeking to estab-
lish phylogenetic relationships among both modern and ancient taxa.
Expansions of the hominin fossil record have exposed a great deal of
independent variation in measurable traits, complicating phylogenetic
assignments. More generally, developments in genomics reveal similar
genetic pathways for phenotypic functions employed by species that
are phylogenetically very distant from one another. These findings
make mechanism questions seem potentially tractable and especially
tantalizing. Only adaptive hypotheses, however, seek to explain why
particular life history features evolve instead of others, why human life
histories have taken their distinctive shape.
One adaptive hypothesis has provided especially influential guid-
ance for research exploring changes in the human lineage. I turn to 
it in a brief concluding section. As Cartmill (1993:191) pointed out,
“the hunting hypothesis was the first truly Darwinian explanation of 
human origins to be proposed.” S. L. Washburn’s (1960; Washburn
and DeVore 1961; Washburn and Moore 1974) especially influential
version of this hypothesis linked work in paleoecology, paleontology,
Paleolithic archaeology, comparative primatology, and hunter-gatherer
ethnography. Now the empirical record in each of the fields on which
Washburn relied is much richer and more complex. The evidence no
longer shows the temporal relationships among the appearances of
human characteristics, which once seemed clear. Nevertheless, dis-
covering what actually happened in the evolution of our lineage still
involves pursuing Washburn’s general research strategy. The same
lines of inquiry he championed, as well as genomics, provide the evi-
dence to build, correct, and revise hypotheses about what happened in
the past. Explicit use of models that link life history features to one
another is an additional tool to help us extract more from the hard evi-
dence on the evolution of our lineage.
L I F E  H I S T O R Y  E V O L U T I O N
Although the foundation goes back to Darwin (1859) and further
to Euler (1760), the field-defining publications in life history evolu-
tion are mostly mid-twentieth century, including Fisher (1930), Cole
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(1954), Williams (1957, 1966b), Hamilton (1966), MacArthur and
Wilson (1967), Lack (1968), Tinkle (1969), and Gadgil and Bossert
(1970). However, the pace of work accelerated so much in the late
eighties and nineties that Stearns, in his 1992 textbook, could write
that “analysis of the evolution of fitness components is a new field, life
history evolution” (Stearns 1992:10).
The Demographic Foundation
Partridge and Harvey’s (1988:1449) succinct definition of life his-
tories as “the probabilities of survival and the rates of reproduction at
each age in the life-span” highlights the demographic framework of
the field and its ties with the conceptual tools of population genetics.
Stearns (1992:10) explained the framework this way:
Life history evolution makes the simplifying claim that the
phenotype consists of demographic traits—birth, age and
size at maturity, number and size of offspring, growth and
reproductive investment, length of life, death—connected
by constraining relationships, tradeoffs…including those
between current reproduction and survival, current repro-
duction and future reproduction, number, size, and sex of
offspring.
The power of this simplification comes from models of population
growth in age-structured populations (Cole 1954; Hamilton 1966;
Gadgil and Bossert 1970; Charlesworth 1994).
The basic equation of both demography and life history evolution
was discovered by Euler in the eighteenth century and rediscovered 
by Lotka in the twentieth (Euler 1760; Lotka 1922; Keyfitz 1977).
Population growth rate (r) is determined by age-specific mortality and
fertility rates. It depends on the probability of survival (lx) and the
average number of offspring produced (mx) by those at each age (x).
These variables are necessarily interdependent because the size of each
newborn cohort depends on the number of females in the offspring-
bearing ages and their fertility rates. Those females come from cohorts
of past newborns. Thus, the number of females in the fertile ages
depends on the number and fertility of females in the past, as well as
the mortality rates of their offspring. When fertility and mortality rates
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are sustained for a few generations, they result in a population with a
stable age distribution. This means that all the age classes then grow
(or decline) at a constant exponential rate (r) and the fraction of the
total population in each age class remains unchanged.
“Although most natural populations are rarely in stable age distri-
bution, moderate deviations from stable age distributions do not often
change qualitative predictions. The Euler-Lotka equation captures
robust features of demography” (Stearns 1992:25). A mutation that
alters the rate of fertility or mortality at any age can affect the popula-
tion growth rate. Comparing the growth rate of the mutant with the
growth rate of the background population therefore indicates the life-
time fitness effect of the mutation and whether it would spread or
decline against the common type.
An additional simplifying assumption is sometimes used. Because
stable populations grow (or decline) exponentially, growth rates must
average near zero most of the time. Otherwise, populations either dis-
appear or overrun the planet. In stationary (that is, nongrowing) pop-
ulations (r = 0), each adult female, on average, exactly replaces herself.
The number of surviving daughters produced by a female over her 
lifetime (R0) is one. When R0 = 1, the relationships among certain life
history variables are necessarily fixed; therefore, assuming that popu-
lations are nongrowing can simplify modeling and analyses (Charnov
1991, 1993, 1997). Stationary populations also have standing age dis-
tributions that mirror the mortality schedule, a useful way to underline
the fundamental link between life histories and the age structure of
populations.
Life history analyses explore the costs and benefits of shifts in mor-
tality and fertility by measuring the magnitude of their lifetime effects.
Because time and energy are limited, more of one thing generally
means less of something else (Maynard Smith 1978; Seger and
Stubblefield 1996). Any increase in fertility or decrease in mortality at
one age likely entails changes in those variables at other ages. Changes
have different consequences for lifetime fitness, depending on which
ages they affect (Cole 1954; Williams 1957; Hamilton 1966; Charlesworth
1994). These consequences and the life histories of ancestral popula-
tions determine the range of possible life histories in immediate
descendants.
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r and K Selection
Over the past several decades, r and K selection has been the most
widely used theory of life history variation. The labels were introduced
by MacArthur and Wilson (1967; Pianka 1970) to capture Dobzhansky’s
(1950) suggestion that in environments subject to extreme variation,
populations will likely “crash.” Mortality would then be independent of
density and largely independent of individual competitive abilities.
Under those conditions, selection would favor features that maximize
the intrinsic rate of population growth (r). In relatively constant envi-
ronments, populations would saturate carrying capacity, K (the con-
ventional symbol for this variable in density-dependent models of
population growth). Then mortality would be density-dependent and
would differentially affect individuals, depending on their efficiency in
acquiring resources. Under those conditions, selection would favor
increased competitive ability. Pianka (1970) enumerated the contrast-
ing characteristics expected for each kind of selection, with K-selected
species investing more in fewer offspring that develop more slowly and
delay reproduction to gain greater competitive ability and larger body
size, living long lives and reproducing repeatedly.
The r and K scheme is intuitively appealing. As Stearns (1992:307)
wrote, it “was suggestive and influential but incorrect.” Problems with
it include the following three (for example, see Promislow and Harvey
1990, 1991; Roff 1992; Stearns 1992; Charlesworth 1994). First, the
associations postulated in the theory are often not found in the world.
Stearns (1977:168) tested the dichotomy on published data on a wide
array of taxa: “In about half the studies…the organisms fit the accepted
scheme…; in the other half they did not.” Promislow and Harvey
(1991:124) noted that “K selection should, by definition, give rise to
increased carrying capacity.… But larger individuals using a greater
amount of resources might actually reduce carrying capacity.” In fact,
maximum densities of different species are negatively correlated with
body mass, larger-bodied species living at lower maximum densities
(Damuth 1981, 1987).
In addition to empirical failures, a second important problem is
the coherence of the assumptions. As Stearns (1977:206) put it:
Unlike r, K cannot be realistically expressed as a function of
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life history traits.… Thus r and K cannot be reduced to units
of common currency. If they do trade off, so that higher r’s
imply lower K’s, the mechanisms by which that tradeoff is
accomplished are not demographic, but are bound up in
physiology and social behavior, and as such could be
expected to change from taxon to taxon.
It is especially important that the r and K distinction ignores dif-
ferences in mortality rates with age, because changes in mortality rates
have different consequences for life history evolution, depending on
which ages are affected. A population in which growth is held in check
by equal mortality increases on all age classes can be comparable to a
population that is allowed to grow unchecked. Selection has the same
effects on life history traits under both conditions (Charlesworth 1994).
Equal mortality increases across all age classes are the same as no mor-
tality changes at all.
A third problem is that the characteristics expected with either r or
K selection can be generated and maintained in stationary (nongrow-
ing) populations by models in which mortality varies with age (Kozlowski
and Weiner 1997; Harvey and Purvis 1999). The circumstances postulat-
ed in the r and K scheme to explain each set of features are therefore
not required for the evolution or maintenance of either one.
Nevertheless, “fast-slow” variation in life cycles and associations
between timing variables and adult body size are empirical regularities
in the living world (Bonner 1965; Western 1979; Clutton-Brock and
Harvey 1983; McMahon and Bonner 1983; Peters 1983; Calder 1984).
Scaling patterns are pervasive (Brown and West 2000). Roff (1992:45)
criticized Pianka for using body lengths of vertebrates and insects to
demonstrate r versus K selection, because “to compare vertebrates and
insects is to compare apples and oranges.” Still, within taxonomic
groups, life history variation does generally fall along a fast-slow con-
tinuum that is associated with variation in body size. As Promislow and
Harvey (1990:418) emphasized, however, “it is important to distinguish
between the empirically observed fast-slow continuum in mammal life
histories and the theoretically derived r-K continuum. There is no
good evidence that increased competitive ability among mammals
results in higher K.”
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Charnov’s Symmetry Approach
An alternative scheme for broad regularities in life history varia-
tion has been developed by E. L. Charnov (1993, 2002), who has shown
that mammals, birds, and fish can be distinguished by characteristic
relationships among life history traits. The relationships among the
traits reflect distinctive symmetries in each taxonomic group by
remaining approximately constant—invariant—when the traits them-
selves change in value. For example, the ratio between species’ average
adult lifespan and average age at maturity is about 1.4 for mammals,
2.3 for birds, and 0.5 for fish (Charnov and Berrigan 1990a; Charnov
1993). To explain these taxonomically distinctive patterns, Charnov
(2002:753) has constructed explanatory models in which “the optimal
life history adjusts some life-history variables…in the face of tradeoffs
with others.… [T]he dimensionless approach to life histories looks for
invariants in the outward life history…and in the tradeoffs that generate
the set of optimal life histories” (italics original).
Unlike r and K selection, Charnov’s approach emphasizes both the
differences among and the similarities within taxonomic groups.
Three “dimensionless numbers, each a benefit-cost ratio summarizing
reproductive timing, allocation and demography, are invariants and
thus are useful to classify life histories”(Charnov 2002:749). He uses
them to represent the distribution of life histories in three dimensions,
a “life history cube.” Mammals, birds, and fish occupy distinct positions
in the cube, defined by their characteristic values on the life history
ratios that delineate the edges: (1) the ratio of offspring size to mater-
nal size, (2) the ratio of relative reproductive effort to adult mortality
rate, and (3) the ratio of adult lifespan to age at maturity. The values
for each variable are averages calculated over age-structured popula-
tions. Charnov (2002:757) wrote:
This classification scheme for life histories differs from
those such as “r- and K-selection”…in that these other
schemes invariably use axes with dimensional magnitudes
such as time or mass. Elephants and squirrels are at opposite
poles in these schemes, and the suggestion is made that nat-
ural selection operates in fundamentally different ways
when we contrast them (opportunistic versus equilibrium,
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for example).… But when we remove absolute magnitude
for time and mass, squirrels and elephants look a lot alike,
and look different from fish or altricial birds. Selection may
well operate similarly on squirrel and elephant life histories
in the sense that…the trade-offs have the same dimension-
less features. My working hypothesis…is that the trade-off
features are the same within (say) altricial birds, mammals or
indeterminate growers like fish, with major differences
between these groups.
To the extent that this holds empirically, the distinctive character-
istics of mammalian (or perhaps, more narrowly, primate) trade-offs
should help students of human evolution hypothesize the ranges of
possible life histories and population age structures of our ancestors
and the extinct taxa in our lineage. A Grandmother hypothesis for the
evolution of human life histories (Hawkes, O’Connell, and Blurton
Jones 1997, 2003; Hawkes et al. 1998; Blurton Jones, Hawkes, and
O’Connell 1999; O’Connell, Hawkes, and Blurton Jones 1999; Alvarez
2000; O’Connell et al. 2002; see Hawkes, chapter 4, this volume, for
more detailed discussion) explicitly builds on Charnov’s mammalian
invariants.
T H E  E V O L U T I O N  O F  F O U R  D I S T I N C T I V E  F E AT U R E S
I N  T H E  H U M A N  L I N E A G E
The empirical record of life history variation among living popu-
lations, the theory to explain that variation, and the fossil record of our
own lineage have all expanded in the past few decades. For a much
longer time, questions about the evolution of particular human life his-
tory features have preoccupied the curious. I largely restrict attention
to work that addresses questions about the appearance of these fea-
tures in the evolution of our lineage, and I discuss the four features in
turn. Investigators often addressed these features two at a time, so the
sections overlap. But each highlights different problems and different
aspects of the record.
Models of life history evolution generally assume that mortality
schedules determine optimal ages of first birth and rates of offspring
production. On those grounds, I should discuss our low adult mor-
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tality (our long lifespans and slow aging) first, with postmenopausal
longevity following, then slow maturation, and finally weaning age. I
begin instead with slow maturation because S. J. Gould’s (1977) Ontogeny
and Phylogeny highlighted that feature especially, sketching a broad his-
tory of ideas about evolutionary change and raising issues that I touch
on again in subsequent sections of this chapter. Gould’s book con-
tinues to influence research on the evolution of human growth and
development.
Slow Maturation
Gould is especially well known for his interest in the role of devel-
opmental mechanisms in shaping the diversity of life and for his cri-
tiques of “the adaptationist program” (for example, Gould and
Lewontin 1979). Ontogeny and Phylogeny (1977), however, emphasized
the fundamental adaptive importance of life history variation. Here are
Gould’s (1977:289–290) own words:
I regard the rise of theoretical population ecology as one of
the most significant events in evolutionary theory during the
past twenty years. For…it has proved that the components of
life history strategies—timing of reproduction, fecundity,
and longevity, for example—are adaptations in themselves,
not merely the consequences of evolving structure and func-
tion.… In short, theoretical population ecology has given us
a new set of parameters for assessing adaptation.
Gould (1977:2) wrote that he began his book about “the ancient
subject of parallels between ontogeny and phylogeny” to rescue an
important topic that was neglected at the time because of associations
with erroneous ideas about evolution: “Properly restructured, it stands
as a central theme in evolutionary biology because it illuminates two
issues of great contemporary importance: the evolution of ecological
strategies and the biology of regulation” (1977:2).
Gould (1977:2) characterized Ontogeny and Phylogeny as “primarily
a long argument for the evolutionary importance of heterochrony—
changes in the relative timing of appearance and rate of development
for characters already present in ancestors.” From the start of the book
(here quoting Gould 1977:8), however, he emphasized that although
LI F E HI S T O RY TH E O RY A N D HU M A N EV O L U T I O N
55Copyrighted Material                         www.sarpress.org
“classical arguments [for the importance of heterochrony] are based
upon the macroevolutionary significance of morphology,” he had a dif-
ferent kind of evolutionary importance in mind: “I focus upon the
immediate significance of acceleration and retardation in the evolu-
tion of life-history strategies for ecological adaptation. In this context,
the timing of maturation assumes special importance” (1977:8).
Although morphological development is very much the subject of
the book, the life history implications of morphology are repeatedly
given priority of importance, for example, “the timing of maturation
(rather than the morphology obtained by speeding up or slowing
down)” (1977:289). In his treatment of human evolution, Gould
(1977:399) reiterates that in discussing “the evolutionary significance
of heterochrony, I have been trying to de-emphasize the traditional
arguments of morphology while asserting the importance of life histo-
ry strategies.”
The r and K scheme was in wide use in the seventies and is a major
theme of the book. Gould (1977:399–400) proposed that it had great
promise for explaining macroevolutionary patterns:
I have linked accelerated development to r-selective regimes
and identified retarded development as a common trait of K
strategists.… I have also tried to link K selection to what we
generally regard as “progressive” in evolution, while suggest-
ing that r selection generally serves as a break upon such
evolutionary change. I regard human evolution as a strong
confirmation of these views.
To begin with, we belong to a class of animals in which K
selection dominates (Pianka 1970).… We belong to an order
of mammals distinguished by their propensity for repeated
single births, intense parental care, long life spans, late mat-
uration, and a high degree of socialization—a point for
point agreement with Pianka’s listing of traits common to K
strategists (1970).
Human evolution has emphasized one feature of this com-
mon primate heritage—delayed development, particularly
as expressed in late maturation and extended childhood.
This retardation has reacted synergistically with other hall-
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marks of hominization—with intelligence (by enlarging the
brain through prolongation of fetal growth tendencies and
by providing a longer period of childhood learning) and
with socialization (by cementing family units through
increased parental care of slowly developing offspring). 
Gould (1977:9) argued that “neoteny has been a (probably the)
major determinant of human evolution.” In documenting both the his-
tory of the idea and the empirical evidence for it, he surmised:
The notion of human neoteny has it roots in two obvious
facts: the striking resemblances between juvenile pongids
and adult humans and the obliteration of this similarity dur-
ing pongid ontogeny by strong negative allometry of the
brain and positive allometry of the jaws.… [T]hese phenom-
ena…had been recognized as soon as juvenile pongids had
reached the zoos and museums of Europe. (Gould 1977:353)
In the 1920s, L. Bolk (for example, 1926) developed his fetaliza-
tion theory of human evolution; the distinctive features of human body
form are seen as fetal conditions in other primates but remain perma-
nent in humans. Gould (1977:356) justified extended attention to the
case Bolk made: “His insight has been ridiculed in the light of modern
doctrine and dismissed in toto because he linked valid and important
data to evolutionary views now rejected.… [But] the data that he pre-
sented can survive the collapse of his explanatory structure.”
While the work of A. H. Schultz is under no such danger of dis-
missal, Gould’s caveat about the value of the data, in spite of an unsus-
tainable explanatory structure, applies to him as well. Schultz had a
very orthogenetic view of primate evolution, but those errors in no way
reduce the value of many of his insights, based as they are on his metic-
ulous attention to measurements and patterns of variation both within
and among populations. Gould uses Schultz’s work to support his argu-
ments about delayed maturation in humans.
Noting our common ancestry with the anthropoid apes, Schultz
(1950:428) had this to say:
Man became distinguished chiefly in connection with his
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three outstanding specializations; the early and undoubt-
edly rapid acquisition of the erect posture, the later, gradual
and ultimately great increase in relative brain-size, and the
comparatively very recent prolongation of his main periods
of life.
With the gradual accumulation of large series of monkeys
and apes it has become possible to compare man with other
primates on the basis of statistically adequate observations
and at all stages of growth. Only in this way can it be decided
whether a particular character is really distinctive in all cases
within a representative, normal range of variations, or dif-
fers merely in regard to the frequency of occurrence, thus
being of lesser significance. With the realization that any
evolutionary change, apparent in the adult, is the result of
some primary alteration in the processes of growth and
development, it seems highly desirable to discover the con-
dition in which human growth differs from the growth of
non-human primates.
Schultz (1956:890) underlines the importance of variation in age at
maturity across the primates:
In regard to all parts of post-natal life one can recognize a
clear trend toward prolongation, beginning in monkeys, as
compared to lemurs, more pronounced in gibbons, still more
in all three great apes and by far the most marked in man. For
instance, general growth, at least in length, is completed in
only 3 years in prosimians, in 7 years in Old World monkeys
such as macaques, in not over 9 years in gibbons, in 11 years in
the large man-like apes, and in as much as 20 years in recent
man. Of special biological significance is the fact that with the
advance on the evolutionary scale of primates, puberty and
the beginning of fertility become more and more chronolog-
ically retarded and thereby the interval between succeeding
generations becomes steadily lengthened.
Schultz’s view that these differences in the time to skeletal maturation
represent a trend of progressive evolution is not consistent with modern
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evolutionary theory, but the differences he points to are real empirical
phenomena. As the final sentence of the passage shows, he recognized
that the demographic implications of age at maturity are especially
important.
Schultz might have agreed with Gould’s endorsement of Bolk’s
central point. Gould ends his chapter on human evolution by reassert-
ing Bolk’s (1926:470) question and answer: “What is the essential in
man as an organism? The obvious answer is: the slow progress of his
life’s course.” But Schultz’s work also showed that slower life histories
did not mean slower growth and development in all corresponding
body parts. “With his fetalization theory, Bolk (1926) had called atten-
tion to ontogenetic retardation as a phylogenetic process. It can be
shown today that accelerations in development have also played a role
in human evolution” (Schultz 1956:888).
Well aware of this, Gould still claimed that neoteny has been the
major determinant of human evolution, a claim that has been actively
debated with many demonstrations of non-neotenous processes in
human growth and development (for example, Shea 1989; McKinney
and McNamara 1991; Godfrey and Sutherland 1996). Gould’s 1977
book might have stimulated more attention to life history, but particu-
lar kinds of morphological heterochrony have been the focus of atten-
tion among students of growth and development (for example, Parker,
Langer, and McKinney 2000; Minugh-Purvis and McNamara 2002;
Thompson, Krovitz, and Nelson 2003).
Much of what has happened in studies of heterochrony is quite
difficult for nonspecialists because of the emphasis on distinguishing dif-
ferent kinds of morphological heterochrony. Shea (2002:79), appraising
the proliferation of recent work, commented:
Certainly, one area where much attention has been focused
involves the recognition and definition of the myriad types
and categories of morphological heterochrony.… [While]
debates over appropriate definitions and classifications 
are certainly a necessary and productive component of 
heterochronic research…they often seem, to insiders and
outsiders alike, as exercises that dwell excessively on ever-
growing mounds of tongue-twisting jargon of uncertain bio-
logical relevance.
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Shea (1981, 1983a) demonstrated that no single heterochronic
shift could account for the differences in either growth trajectories or
adult form among the African apes (Leigh and Shea 1996).
Subsequent work has underlined the generality of that finding. Leigh
and Park (1998:348), investigating “the evolution of human growth
prolongation,” compared velocity curves of growth across many species
of primates on an array of dimensions and found that
relative size, velocity relative to size-for-age, and estimates of
the pace of ontogeny (timing variables) show appreciable
amounts of variation independent of adult size. Variation
that is unrelated to adult size is typical during early periods
of primate ontogeny, and may reflect a high degree of adap-
tive variation. Low phylogenetically adjusted correlations for
some of these variables suggest that attributes of early
growth periods and adult body size are often uncoupled,
and evolve independently.
Such independence has repeatedly confronted analysts looking for
correlated adjustments in morphological variation. Investigators
exploring the mismatch between phenotypic and molecular similari-
ties in papionin primates find substantial variation in growth patterns
across the tribe (Collard and Wood 2001). Collard and O’Higgins
(2001) and Leigh, Shah, and Buchanan (2003) measured crania from
ontogenetic series of various genera to characterize the growth pat-
terns that result in adult faces. Both studies not only improve under-
standing of the ontogeny and evolution of papionin faces but also
reveal diversity in the patterns of growth and development. Leigh,
Shah, and Buchanan (2003:307) concluded that “ontogenetic allomet-
ric data may not be informative regarding papionin taxonomy.”
Schultz had pointed out that even though prolonged life periods
distinguish people from other primates, this does not mean that all
aspects of human growth and development are slower. In his 1960
review of “age changes in primates and their modification in man,”
Schultz (1960:19) referred to a large study of skeletal changes with age
in young American males, which found maturation changes to share a
common, orderly process. He remarked:
Closely corresponding to this intraspecific constancy in gen-
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eral sequence and variability in timing of the age changes of
man we find intergenerically among primates few major
deviations from one common pattern of development, but
many marked modifications in the relative timing during
the maturation of epiphyses, sutures, dentition, hair, etc.
(Schultz 1960:29)
Gould (1977) appreciated this variability. Recognizing that not only
neoteny but also multiple heterochronic processes are implicated in
human evolution, he wrote:
No Darwinian supporter of retardation as a major element
in human evolution can deny that many distinctive features
are not peadomorphic; the concept of mosaic evolution
practically requires such a belief.… The evolutionary direc-
tion of each feature is controlled by natural selection; the
capacity for independent variation of characteristics is very
great. (Gould 1977:364–365)
Yet, at the same time, Gould pinned substantial hope on finding
that developmental mechanisms limit that independence. His claim
that “features of an organism are bound (often quite loosely) in covari-
ant sets, and these sets are often dissociable as blocks” (Gould 1982:341
–342) is cited by Shea (1983b:522), who explicitly hoped that “this
‘shuffling’ of the developmental trajectories of various body regions
may provide new adaptive morphological configurations with minimal
genetic changes.”
Ontogeny and Phylogeny was published just after M.-C. King and A.
C. Wilson’s (1975:107) summary showing that “the genetic distance
between humans and the chimpanzee is probably too small to account
for their substantial organismal differences.” King and Wilson
(1975:107) hypothesized that “regulatory mutations account for the
major biological differences between humans and chimpanzees.”
Citing their work, Gould (1977:9) wrote:
Humans and chimpanzees are almost identical in structural
genes, yet differ markedly in form and behavior. This para-
dox can be resolved by invoking a small genetic difference
with profound effects—alterations in the regulatory system
that slow down the general rate of development in humans.
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Heterochronic changes are regulatory changes; they
require only an alteration in the timing of features already
present.
The emphasis is on mechanisms. While Gould appreciated that
demographic processes shape life histories and he recognized the
capacity of selection to modify individual morphological features inde-
pendently, he expected developmental mechanisms to explain human
differences. The mechanisms that give rise to a variant and the net fit-
ness benefits that spread and maintain it are equally important
domains of inquiry. But they demand different kinds of research. Life
history evolution generally seeks to explain species differences in age
at maturity through the fitness effects of shifts in that trait under pre-
vailing demographic constraints.
Long Lifespans and Slow Aging
Gould (1977) cited G. A. Sacher (1959; Sacher and Staffeldt 1974),
who made especially important contributions to the evolution of
longevity. A footnote in Ontogeny and Phylogeny (1977) mentioned the
associations Sacher found between brain size and maturation time
across the mammals as corroborating evidence for Gould’s neoteny
argument. Gould (1977:371n) concluded that “the neotenic hypothe-
sis applies whether brain enlargement precedes more general retarda-
tion or vice versa.” The associations between brain size and maturation
time that Sacher discovered became a component of his inquiry into
the evolution of longevity. Sacher (1975:417) argued that human
longevity “is distinctive and important enough to merit being listed,
along with symbolic and tool making behavior, as a distinguishing fea-
ture of the human species.”
Finding a strong relationship between brain size and maximum
lifespan across mammals, Sacher (1975:426) favored two mutually com-
patible hypotheses “about the causal processes responsible for the rela-
tion.” One is that the brain “participates in the stabilization of the life
processes of the organism.… In other words, the brain is postulated to
be an ORGAN OF LONGEVITY” (1975:426, emphasis original). The
other is that “the evolution of a larger brain imposes on the species an
added metabolic and developmental burden, and a consequent
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decreased reproductive rate that can only be compensated by means 
of an extension of the reproductive span, and hence of lifespan”
(1975:426). He considered the second hypothesis to be confirmed by
his finding that two brain size variables, neonatal brain weight and the
ratio of neonatal to adult brain weight, are correlated with two life his-
tory variables, gestation time and litter size across ninety-one mammal
species, including nineteen primates (Sacher 1975).
Sacher had earlier concluded (Sacher and Staffeldt 1974) that a
common growth law for mammalian brains is the rate-limiting process
for all other aspects of somatic growth. Therefore, brain size “provides
an objective basis for the estimation of relative maturation times of
related species that differ in brain size” (Sacher 1975:427). On those
grounds, Sacher used cranial capacity to estimate both lifespan and
maturation times in fossil hominin taxa. From the data available at the
time, he estimated that australopithecines were later maturing and
longer-lived than modern chimpanzees, that Neanderthals were simi-
lar to modern humans, and that Homo erectus was intermediate between
australopiths and modern people.
Sacher’s hypothesis that brains controlled both maturation and
longevity was partly based on his (1959) finding that although brain
weight is correlated with body weight across the mammals and body
weight is correlated with lifespan, the correlation between lifespan and
brain weight was significantly stronger. In response to Sacher, others
showed that spleen, adrenal, and kidney mass are as well correlated
with lifespan as is brain mass (Calder 1976; Economos 1980a; Prothero
and Jürgens 1987). One recognized reason why organ weights show
stronger correlations with life history variables than do body weights is
that organ masses vary less among adults over time, making them more
stable measures of animal size.
The reason for the better prediction of life span from brain
mass is that brain mass has less variability than body mass.
The body mass of any individual or species can vary widely,
depending upon its energy balance situation.… [W]ithin
species, or when the mammals are treated together, the
coefficient of variation for brain mass is less than half that
for body mass. (Lindstedt and Calder 1981:12)
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There is a substantial literature on brain-size/body-size measures
and the relationships between them (for example, Prothero and
Jürgens 1987; Pagel and Harvey 1989; Harvey and Krebs 1990; Barton
1999). Sacher (1959) devised an “index of cephalization” to measure
brain size relative to body size, and much subsequent work has focused
on the evolution of brains that are relatively large for body size, espe-
cially in primates (R. Martin 1990) and in the human lineage (for
example, Jerison 1973; Aiello and Wheeler 1995; Allman 1999).
Increases in this relative measure are correlated with increased lifespan
in primates, but not in other mammalian orders (Austad and Fischer
1992; but see van Schaik et al., chapter 5, this volume).
Sacher’s ideas about the role of brains in determining the pace of
life histories do not include the usual assumption that the function of
delayed maturity is to allow more time to learn. He cited Dobzhansky
(1962) for the widespread claim “that the maturation times of
hominids get longer because they have more to learn” (Sacher 1975:
429). “Hominids do indeed have more to learn,” Sacher (1975:429)
agreed, “but the essence of hominization is that they are able to learn
more rapidly.” Still, he favored the hypothesis that age at maturity
depended on brain size: “A more reasonable assumption…is that the
learning process speeds up to fit into the maturation period defined by
an optimum pattern of mammalian brain growth” (1975:429).
Sacher’s hypotheses about the causal mechanisms linking brains to
life history variables have not fared well (see, for example, Allman
1999; Deaner, Barton, and van Schaik 2003; and Robson, van Schaik,
and Hawkes, chapter 2, this volume, on brain growth patterns in
humans and chimpanzees), but his discovery that lifespan is one of the
life history features generally predictable from organism size remains
extremely important. Calder (1984:4) summarized the importance of
size this way:
Suppose we encounter a new beast that we wish to under-
stand.… If we know only its “weight” we can predict (give or
take 25% or so) a wide variety of its specifications and
requirements: home range, heart and metabolic rates, life
span—each from an empirical allometric equation based on
body size.
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Lifespan, usually (but not always) meaning observed maximum
lifespan, has come to be a widely used measure of longevity (D. W. E.
Smith 1993). But starting with Sacher’s use of observed maximum lifes-
pan in the 1959 Ciba symposium, it has drawn objections. G. C.
Williams (1999:405) framed his long-standing complaint this way: “It is
clearly true that different species have different demographies.… This
does not mean that any maximum observed age can be identified as a
species characteristic.” Williams (1999:405) worried that a specified
maximum lifespan suggests erroneously that “death is a programmed
event in life history,” an idea inconsistent with evolutionary theories of
aging. There are, nevertheless, ways that maximum lifespan is very use-
ful in comparisons among populations and across species. The popu-
lation average is the best single summary of lifetime survival, so life
expectancy at birth or mean lifespan may seem a better single para-
meter than observed maximum lifespan to characterize a population’s
mortality experience. But mean lifespan does not distinguish differ-
ences in mortality with age. Consequently, it obscures both important
cross-species differences and important intraspecies similarities.
Life expectancy is the probable number of additional years of life
remaining for a cohort. Given a life table, which records the rates of
death at each age, it can be calculated from any age. For example, life
expectancy at the beginning of adulthood (at about 19 or 20 years of
age for women [Robson, van Schaik, and Hawkes, chapter 2, this vol-
ume]) is the expectation of life for those who have reached adulthood,
the average adult lifespan—a very useful parameter. When used with-
out an age qualification, however, life expectancy refers to the expec-
tation of life from birth. Because it is an average for an entire cohort,
life expectancy at birth includes the lives of all who die as infants and
juveniles. These short lives have large effects on the estimate.
Sacher (1959) focused attention on the important difference
between life expectancy at birth and how long adults are likely to live.
He said that he used “maximum documented longevity” in cross-
species comparisons not only because complete life tables—necessary
to calculate life expectancy—were available for so few species but also
because life expectancy is not a stable parameter. “This is clearly seen
in the life-tables of human populations in different countries or in the
same country in different historical periods. Instances can be found in
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which life expectations vary by more than a factor of two, but even in
these extreme cases the lifespans do not differ by as much as 20 per-
cent” (Sacher 1959:115).
Williams also seconded the common concern that maximum
observed age at death might be so highly sensitive to sample size that
it could not be a stable index of adult mortality rates. Sacher (1959,
1975) showed that this concern was misplaced. The relevant probabil-
ity estimates for the behavior of a variable like maximum recorded
lifespan come from the statistics of extremes. When adult mortality fol-
lows a Gompertz function—increasing exponentially with age (as fish,
bird, and mammal mortality schedules do)—the exponential term
always dominates at advanced ages. Consequently, “the characteristic
oldest age increases as a double logarithmic function of the cohort
size” (Sacher 1959:115). “In consequence the maximum expected sur-
vival increases very slowly” with sample size (Sacher 1975:419). “What
this means in practice, as I have now confirmed for a large number of
species, is that as the number of maximum survival times from differ-
ent zoos increases, the maximum of this set of values increases very
slowly and becomes virtually stationary for practical purposes”
(1975:419).
Sacher’s attention to maximum lifespan as an especially useful vari-
able played a significant role in developments in life history theory. 
R. J. H. Beverton and S. J. Holt participated in the 1959 Ciba confer-
ence where Sacher reported his methods and findings. Studying the
effects of harvest rates on fish life histories, Beverton and Holt (1959;
Beverton 1963) required an estimate of adult mortality rates. They
found data available, even approximately, for very few populations of
interest. Citing Sacher (1959) for pioneering the technique of using
maximum lifespan as a stable measure of longevity, Beverton (1963)
showed that the “characteristic maximum age,” the oldest individual
observed, provided a useful index of the adult mortality rate in a popu-
lation. Beverton both evaluated and exploited Sacher’s argument about
the statistics of extremes, and Charnov subsequently used Beverton’s
work as a foundation for his symmetry approach. Following Beverton,
Charnov (1993) found that maximum lifespan provided a useful index
of average adult lifespan, the inverse of adult mortality rates.
Adult mortality is, in turn, linked with aging. It was G. C. Williams
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(1957) who first used life history theory to lay out basic expecta-
tions about the evolution of senescence, defined as declines in fitness-
related performance with age. Williams (1957) showed how the theory
of natural selection can explain why organisms get old and why mem-
bers of different species age at different rates. His model of “antago-
nistic pleiotropy” is an evolutionary explanation for aging that is built
on the decline in force of selection with age. Because some mortality
risk is inevitable—even without senescence—cohorts necessarily
become smaller at each successive age. Consequently, selection acts
more strongly on mutations that affect phenotypic performance at
younger adult ages. When the same genes have effects at different
adult ages, positive effects earlier in life are favored at the expense of
consequent negative effects on performance at older ages. One expec-
tation about rates of senescence that comes from evolutionary life 
history theory is that selection against senescence should be stronger
—and therefore rates of aging slower—in species with low rates of
adult mortality. Another is that selection against senescence should be
stronger when fitness-increasing opportunities rise with adult age. 
W. D. Hamilton (1966) provided the classic formal demonstration of
demographic constraints on senescence, using data on a human pop-
ulation to do so.
T. B. L. Kirkwood’s (1977, 1981; Kirkwood and Rose 1991) “dis-
posable soma” model has been an especially productive elaboration on
these arguments because it focuses on the demographic effects of
trade-offs between repair of somatic damage that slows senescence, on
one hand, and investments in current reproduction, on the other. The
processes of life result in inevitable damage to cells (for example,
Beckman and Ames 1998). That damage can be lessened or repaired,
but allocation to those processes leaves less for growth and reproduc-
tion. Given such a trade-off, selection can never favor perfect repair.
Variants that invest too much in somatic maintenance have lower life-
time fitness and are outcompeted by alternatives that put less into
somatic maintenance and more into producing descendants.
Reviewing the history of ideas, R. Holliday (1995:102) noted that
initially, the disposable soma theory took into account accu-
racy in macromolecular synthesis.… [Then] the metabolic
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cost of repair of macromolecules was an obvious inclusion
(Kirkwood 1981), and later on many other types of mecha-
nism were discussed in terms of the maintenance of the
adult organism.… Today the disposable soma theory
includes the considerable metabolic expense of all such
maintenance mechanisms and the tradeoff between this
expense and the investment of resources into growth to
adulthood and reproduction.
Kirkwood’s model speaks to Williams’ question, why do organisms
age? and shows why disposable somas result from natural selection. It
also speaks readily to the questions, why does aging ever slow? how can
increased longevity evolve? If the lifetime fitness benefits for a marginal-
ly increased investment in somatic repair outweigh the benefits for the
same investment in reproduction at younger ages, selection favors more
somatic maintenance. If adult mortality rates go down, the chances of
staying alive longer to benefit from a more durable soma increase, and
selection favors increased somatic effort. As Williams (1957:404) noted,
“low adult death rates should be associated with low rates of senescence, and high
adult death rates with high rates of senescence…[so] we should be able to pre-
dict rates of senescence on the basis of adult mortality rates” (italics orig-
inal). Subsequent work (for example, Ricklefs 1998) has confirmed that
empirical correlations between adult mortality rates and aging rates
across samples of mammals and birds are consistent with the theory (see
Hawkes, chapter 4, this volume, for further discussion).
Long average adult lifespans characterize living human popu-
lations (Robson, van Schaik, and Hawkes, chapter 2, this volume). 
For past populations, the ages at death represented in skeletal assem-
blages would seem the obvious source of information about mortal-
ity rates. Researchers investigating aging have often relied on these 
data to estimate past mortality rates (Williams 1957; Austad 1997).
Increasingly, though, paleodemographers have come to appreciate
why the archaeological assemblages are not a straightforward reflec-
tion of population mortality rates (see Konigsberg and Herrmann,
chapter 9, this volume). “[A] number of natural and cultural filters
conspire to produce archaeological skeletal samples that cannot be
considered as random samples of all members of a population who
died within a certain period” (Konigsberg and Frankenberg 1994:92).
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Among these filters, the following three are especially important 
for estimating rates of death at different ages from archaeological sam-
ples. First, taphonomic processes differentially affect bones by sex and
age (P. L. Walker 1995). The surprising magnitude of possible preserva-
tion bias was demonstrated by Walker, Johnson, and Lambert (1988) on
a cemetery in California where mission records showed that 53 percent
of the adults interred in the cemetery were older than 45 years of age but
only 7 percent of the adult skeletons recovered were older than 45. As
the investigators cautioned, other things being equal, the magnitude of 
the age-related bias should be “roughly proportional to the length of
time a group of burials has been in the ground” (Walker, Johnson, and
Lambert 1988:188), a stark warning for Paleolithic samples.
The second problem of bias in the age-at-death distribution of skele-
tal assemblages is also serious. Remains of individuals of different ages
and sexes may be deposited in different places. Among modern people,
for example, juveniles and adults may be interred in cemeteries, but
infants may not. Most Neanderthal remains have been discovered in
cave deposits, and as E. Trinkaus (1995:138) noted, older individuals
may be underrepresented if “the elderly were dying in or adjacent to
shelters less frequently than younger members of the population.”
Of remains that actually are recovered, age-at-death misestimation
is a third substantial problem. J.-P. Bocquet-Appel and C. Masset’s
“Farewell to Paleodemography” (1982) was prompted by comparisons
between the mortality schedules of Europeans constructed by histori-
cal demographers working with texts and those constructed by pale-
odemographers working with skeletal material often from related
populations in similar time ranges. Bocquet-Appel and Masset showed
the mismatch in estimated mortality schedules and found that the dis-
tinctive age structures produced by paleodemographers resulted from
systematic biases due to the characteristics of the reference samples
used in aging adult skeletons. They concluded that “early mortality of
adults, overmortality of women, lack of old people in those popula-
tions, whether prehistoric or medieval: all these hackneyed notions
were born from the misinterpretation of data. As they are in no way 
vindicated, we must get rid of them” (Bocquet-Appel and Masset
1982:329).
Assessing responses to these difficulties, L. W. Konigsberg and 
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S. R. Frankenberg (1994:93) concluded that “unfortunately there are
no ‘magic bullets’ that can be uniformly applied to remove the biases
caused by biological and cultural filters.” Nevertheless, they pronounced
paleoanthropology “not quite dead” because emerging methods
promised much improved age-at-death estimates. Increasingly sophis-
ticated mathematical tools extract more accurate, if less precise, infor-
mation about the distribution of ages in modern human skeletal
assemblages (Hoppa and Vaupel 2002a; Konigsberg and Herrmann,
chapter 9, this volume). Analysts now recognize that they must start
with a model of “how the chance of death varies with age” (Hoppa and
Vaupel 2002b:3). This echoes a point N. Howell (1976a:25) made
about the necessary reliance of paleodemography on the “uniformi-
tarian assumption” that “the human animal has not basically changed
in its direct biological response to the environment in processes of ovu-
lation, spermatogenesis, length of pregnancy, degree of helplessness of
the young and rates of maturation and senility over time.”
If this holds across modern humans, what of other members of our
evolutionary lineage? Konigsberg and Frankenberg (1994:92–93)
assumed that “the evolutionary details that modified a basic pongid life
history into a hominid one remain obscure, but aspects of recent
demographic history are assailable. Study of the last 10,000 years or so
is an important part of anthropological discourse.” They went on to say
that “with relatively new appreciation of the problems of age estima-
tion, sample bias, and the complexity of relationships among fertility,
mortality, population growth and life table analysis, we see paleode-
mography as just beginning to embark on what should be a truly pro-
ductive phase of research” (Konigsberg and Frankenberg 1994:104).
Yet, some of the complexity they note, long recognized by demog-
raphers, still remains to be appreciated by students of human evolution.
Of particular importance here, the erroneous inference that life
expectancy (at birth) is an index of adult lifespans leads to mistaken
assumptions about age structures in past human populations. The error
was committed by S. L. Washburn (1981:11) decades ago: “In the last
100 years, the expectation of length of life for human beings has
increased dramatically.… The result is a situation that is entirely new
from the point of view of evolution—a very large number of human
beings living to ages far beyond those that were normal for the species.”
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As Sacher had already observed, though, life expectancy is not a
good index of longevity (and see D. W. E. Smith 1993). It is strongly
affected by infant and juvenile mortality rates. Recently, J. Oeppen and
R. W. Vaupel (2002) demonstrated the remarkably steady increase in
the global record for national life expectancy, essentially linear since
1840. Emphasizing the importance of this persistent recent trend, they
also noted that “before 1950, most of the gain in life expectancy was
due to large reductions in death rates at younger ages” (Oeppen and
Vaupel 2002:1029). In those populations with much lower life expectan-
cies than the current record holders, people who did not die in child-
hood had long average adult lifespans, with good chances of living to a
ripe old age (see Paine and Boldsen, chapter 10, this volume).
Demographers long ago demonstrated that variation in life
expectancies in human populations have surprisingly small effects on
adult age structure. Fertility levels have large effects (for example, Coale
1956; Coale and Demeny 1966 [second edition, 1983]). The Coale and
Demeny model life tables for stable (human) populations show what
initially seems counterintuitive. Holding fertility constant and tripling
life expectancy from twenty to sixty years, the fraction of adults (those
older than 15) who are older than 45 differs within only five percent-
age points. Also—perhaps initially paradoxically—the proportion of
elders is largest when life expectancy is lowest (Hawkes 2004b; Hawkes
and Blurton Jones 2005). Careful ethnographic demography of mod-
ern hunter-gatherers repeatedly finds life expectancies shorter than
four decades and also finds the characteristic and distinctive feature of
human age structures: about a third of the adults are older than 45
(Howell 1979; Hill and Hurtado 1996; Blurton Jones, Hawkes, and
O’Connell 2002).
Both models and data show that it is incorrect to infer that people
could not have had long lifespans in prehistory, because “life expectan-
cies over forty years were never reported for any population prior to
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries” (Crews and Gerber 2003:
20). It is misleading to reason that “if typical life expectancy among our
recent hominid predecessors was only three or four decades…less than
half of the total lifespan of a typical individual would have been spent
as an adult” (Krovitz, Nelson, and Thompson 2003:1).
The difficulties in estimating adult mortality rates from age-at-
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death estimates of past populations are increasingly well understood.
Investigators continue to work at reducing biases in age estimation (for
example, Aykroyd et al. 1999; Miles 2001; Hoppa and Vaupel 2002a;
Konigsberg and Herrmann, chapter 9, this volume), and perhaps the
taphonomic biases can be estimated. But neither of these correctives
removes the “cultural filter” (Konigsberg and Frankenberg 1994) that
makes skeletal assemblages a biased sample of deaths. As a conse-
quence, body size continues to be a favored index, even by paleode-
mographers (Konigsberg and Frankenberg 1994), for estimating
variation in lifespan across hominins. The cross-species associations
between size and maximum lifespan recognized by Sacher have been
confirmed in greater detail in expanded and improved data sets
(Harvey and Clutton-Brock 1985; Finch 1990; Allman, McLaughlin,
and Hakeem 1993; Hammer and Foley 1996; Barton 1999; Judge and
Carey 2000; Deaner, Barton, and van Schaik 2003), and maximum life-
span is a useful index of average adult lifespans and adult mortality
rates (Beverton 1963; Charnov 1993).
Size, however, is a variable with problems of its own, as noted above
in regard to brains and bodies. Additional difficulties arise in estimat-
ing it from fossil specimens (for example, Kappelman 1996; R. Smith
1996), but there are some strong patterns. McHenry (1991, 1992) dem-
onstrated that australopiths, even those with very robust crania, were
substantially smaller in body size than early members of genus Homo
(Wood and Collard 1999b). The change from a chimpanzee-size aus-
tralopith ancestor to the first widely successful members of our genus,
in which both brain size and maternal body size approximately dou-
bled, signals a shift in life history (Smith and Tompkins 1995; O’Connell,
Hawkes, and Blurton Jones 1999; Aiello and Key 2002; Aiello and Wells
2002; Hawkes, O’Connell, and Blurton Jones 2003).
Within genus Homo, brain size and body size do not always change
together (Hawkes, O’Connell, and Blurton Jones 2003; Skinner and
Wood, chapter 11, this volume). Ruff, Trinkaus, and Holliday (1997:
173–174) estimated body mass and cranial capacities for genus Homo
across the Pleistocene and concluded that an apparent increase in
body size from Early to Late Pleistocene “is largely an artifact of two
confounding variables: sex and geography.… There is a bias toward
males in our Late Pleistocene sample…[and] the apparent sudden
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increase in average body mass during the latter Middle Pleistocene is
largely a result of the inclusion of higher-latitude specimens.”
As to relative brain size, they found that
early to early Middle Pleistocene (1,800–600 kyr BP) Homo
was about one third less encephalized than recent humans,
and there was no increase in encephalization quotient (EQ)
throughout this time period. By the early Late Pleistocene
(150–100 kyr BP), EQ had increased to values within about
10% of those of recent humans. (Ruff, Trinkaus, and
Holliday 1997:175)
Finally, they show “that a decrease in average absolute brain size over
the past 35,000 years within H. sapiens was paralleled by a correspond-
ing decrease in average body size, supporting earlier suggestions of a
general correlated size reduction in the human skeleton since the early
Upper Paleolithic” (Ruff, Trinkaus, and Holliday 1997:175).
How big is a modern human? To the extent that body size can be
estimated for a taxon and this can index longevity, the sample and esti-
mates provided by Ruff and colleagues suggest no large differences
between the early members of our genus (as defined by Wood and
Collard 1999b), archaics, and Upper Paleolithic moderns. Brains, how-
ever, are larger and encephalization greater in Middle Paleolithic
humans. If it is brain size that predicts longevity, then (as Sacher con-
cluded) Neanderthals and moderns must have similar lifespans, longer
than those of earlier members of the genus, with those, in turn, longer
than those of australopiths.
Postmenopausal Longevity
When lifespans are longer—adult mortalities lower—selection
against senescence is stronger, and aging is slower. However, the
ovaries of living humans do not age any more slowly than those of liv-
ing chimpanzees (Hawkes 2003; Robson, van Schaik, and Hawkes,
chapter 2, this volume). We establish our maximum store of oocytes in
fetal life, and the number of follicles remaining declines from birth
onward (Block 1952; Richardson, Senikas, and Nelson 1987; O’Connor,
Holman, and Wood 2001). Recent evidence in mice (Johnson, et al.
2004; Johnson, et al. 2005) challenges long-standing orthodoxy that, in
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mammals, no new follicles are produced during adulthood. Still, the
net number of follicles declines with age across all mammalian clades
(vom Saal, Finch, and Nelson 1994). The physiology of menopause, in
particular, is known to be quite similar in humans, chimpanzees, and
several species of macaques (Graham, Kling, and Steiner 1979; Gould,
Flint, and Graham 1981; Nozaki, Mitsunaga, and Shimizu 1995; M. L.
Walker 1995). Unlike other primates, however, humans reach terminal
fertility and then menopause when aging is less advanced in other
physiological systems (Gosden 1985; Hill and Hurtado 1991; Pavelka
and Fedigan 1991; Caro et al. 1995).
Williams (1957) raised the topic of human mid-life menopause
explicitly when he addressed the problem of aging from the perspec-
tive of evolutionary life history theory. Theory predicts that “there
should be little or no post-reproductive period in the normal life of any
species,” but “at first sight it appears that this prediction is not realized.
Long post-reproductive periods are known in many domesticated ani-
mals and in man himself. In man it may be even longer than the repro-
ductive period” (1957:407). But Williams (1957:407) went on to say
that “these observations lose much of their seeming importance when
it is realized that they are largely artifacts of civilization. In very primi-
tive conditions, such as prevailed throughout almost all of man’s evo-
lution post-reproductive individuals were extremely rare.”
The evidence Williams (1957:407) cited for this rarity was a tabu-
lation of estimated ages at death in a series of Paleolithic and Mesolithic
skeletons in which only 3 of 173 specimens “were over fifty and none
was much older than this.” Twenty-two years later, Williams (1999:407)
reiterated the same conclusion: “Young-adult mortality rates in the Stone
Age were such that only a trivial minority would live beyond what we 
now call middle age.” I reviewed biases inherent in estimating adult mor-
tality rates and population age structures from such data above. Those
known biases, combined with the data from careful hunter-gatherer
demographies, are grounds for disputing the common claim, here com-
ing from Williams, that old people are an artifact of civilization.
Williams’ other hypothesis (1957:407–408) about the evolution of
mid-life menopause in women was this:
At some time during human evolution it may have become
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advantageous for a woman of forty-five or fifty to stop divid-
ing her declining faculties between the care of extant off-
spring and the production of new ones. A termination of
increasingly hazardous pregnancies would enable her to
devote her whole remaining energy to the care of her living
children, and would remove childbirth mortality as a possi-
ble cause of failure to raise these children. Menopause,
although apparently a cessation of reproduction, may have
arisen as a reproductive adaptation to a life-cycle already
characterized by senescence, unusual hazards in pregnancy
and childbirth, and a long period of juvenile dependence.
This “stopping early” hypothesis has stimulated work on the opti-
mal timing of menopause. Trade-offs like those hypothesized by
Williams might explain why selection maintains the observed modal
age of menopause in women (for example, Hill and Hurtado 1991,
1996; Rogers 1993; Packer, Tatar, and Collins 1998; Peccei 2001;
Shanley and Kirkwood 2001). Noting that the age of fertility decline
and menopause appears to be about the same in chimpanzees and
people whereas human adult mortalities are much lower, Hawkes and
colleagues (1998) pointed to the simplest phylogenetic inference: our
longevity, not our age at menopause, is derived. Ovarian ontogeny may
have remained more or less the same throughout both hominin and
chimpanzee lineages from our common ancestor. If so, the age of meno-
pause did not alter; it became a mid-life process when greater lon-
gevity evolved in the human lineage. That makes the evolutionary
question, what could favor slower aging while not favoring later ages 
of childbearing at the same time?
E. Trinkaus and R. L. Tompkins (1987) proposed that our slower
aging and longer lifespans may not have evolved until the appearance
of moderns. They estimated the ages at death of individuals assumed
to be among the oldest Neanderthal adults and, combining their 
findings with other reports, noted “the extreme rarity and possible
absence of Neanderthals greater than 40 to 45 years in the fossil
record” (Trinkaus and Tompkins 1987:128). Using these data and
other lines of evidence, they proposed “the intriguing possibility” that
“the significant postreproductive survival of recent humans had not yet
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emerged among these late archaic humans”; instead, “archaic mem-
bers of the genus Homo [may have] had lifespans similar to those of
wild chimpanzees” (Trinkaus and Tompkins 1990:174). They recog-
nized that if this were so, age at maturity in Neanderthals must 
have been earlier as well. “Retarded developmental rates among 
Nean-derthals approaching that presumed for recent humans” could
not have been favored if adult mortalities were so high (1990:159).
Subsequently, concern about the age-at-death estimates on which they
relied and about the viability of populations with chimpanzee adult
mortality profiles and even slightly slower maturation than chim-
panzees led Trinkaus to reconsider those earlier lifespan estimates.
Revisiting the evidence, Trinkaus (1995:139) still surmised that young
adult mortality must have been high compared with ethnographically
known hunter-gatherers, but he concluded “that the Neanderthals had
a demographic pattern similar to those of at least some modern human
populations.”
The under-representation of older adults in fossil remains of both
Neanderthals and Neanderthal ancestors is a recurrent finding.
Analyzing the assemblage of Middle Pleistocene Neanderthal ancestors
from the Atapuerca Sima de los Huesos, J. M. Bermúdez de Castro 
and M. E. Nicolás (1997:333) reported that “longevity was probably no
greater than 40 years.” On the basis of more complete analysis of the
assemblage and comparison with other Middle Pleistocene European
assemblages, Bermúdez de Castro and colleagues (2004:22) concluded
“from the fossil evidence that the effective life span of Middle Pleis-
tocene populations in Europe probably did not exceed 40–45.”
Employing the same toothwear seriation technique (Miles 1963)
used by Bermúdez de Castro and colleagues to age adults, R. Caspari
and S.-H. Lee (2004) produced an “OY ratio” of older to younger
adults for skeletal dentitions from an array of hominin taxa: australop-
ithecines, Homo erectus, Neanderthals, and Upper Paleolithic moderns.
Their young adult category consisted of dentitions with the third molar
erupted but limited tooth wear. “Older adults were defined as twice the
age of reproductive maturation, the age at which one could theoreti-
cally first become a grandmother” (Caspari and Lee 2004:10896). The
ratio of older to younger adults was taken to be an index of longevity.
Caspari and Lee (2004:10898) wrote:
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Two important conclusions emerge from this study: first,
there is significant increased longevity between all groups,
indicating a trend of increased survivorship of older adults
through human evolution. Second, the increase is by far 
the greatest in the early modern humans of the Upper
Paleolithic, when for the first time there are a larger number
of older adults than younger adults in the death distribu-
tion. Whereas high levels of young adult mortality have been
noted for Neanderthals (Trinkaus 1995), the magnitude of
the increase in OY ratios in the Upper Paleolithic is never-
theless surprising.
Caspari and Lee’s OY ratio was 0.39 for Neanderthals and 2.08 for
Upper Paleolithic moderns, a fivefold difference.
Problems of taphonomic bias and age-at-death estimations, as well
as the unknown relationship between the age distribution of skeletal
assemblages and the mortality experience of populations, would apply
to these dentitions. Another problem is specific to their definition of
old and young adults. The scaling relationships in primate—and there-
fore probably in hominin—life histories mean that such an OY ratio
would likely be insensitive to longevity.
Caspari and Lee chose this ratio because age at maturity is not known
for the nonmodern taxa, but as Schultz (1956, 1960) and then B. H.
Smith (1989a) had shown, eruption of the third molar is a useful marker
of maturity across the primates. By choosing a trait that is “independent
of actual ages,” Caspari and Lee could avoid contention about the actual
age estimates. However, the “invariant” relationship between age at matu-
rity and adult mortality highlighted by Charnov’s model of mammalian
life history evolution implies that when old is defined as twice the age at
maturity, the ratio of old to young adults might be similarly invariant.
Because longevity and age at maturity are positively correlated across the
mammals, including the primates—even modern humans (Charnov
1993; Charnov and Berrigan 1993; Hawkes et al. 1998; Alvarez 2000)—
the same invariance likely held among past hominins. If the relationship
between these two variables is approximately constant, then the fraction
of adults that are more than double the age at maturity might be about
the same, whether average adult lifespans are short or long.
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Data on living populations illustrate exactly this (Hawkes and
O’Connell 2005). The proportions of adults in the old categories
defined as twice the age of M3 eruption can be calculated for standing
populations of foraging people and chimpanzees, using data in Smith,
Crummett, and Brandt’s (1994) compendium of tooth eruption ages
in primates, life tables for modern chimpanzees in the wild (Hill et al.
2001), and life tables for three modern hunter-gatherer populations
(!Kung: Howell 1979; Ache: Hill and Hurtado 1996; Hadza: Blurton
Jones, Hawkes, and O’Connell 2002). The central tendency of M3
eruption in Smith and colleagues’ sample of female chimpanzees (n =
7) is 10.7 years; in their sample of women (n = 663), it is 20.4 years.
Using Caspari and Lee’s definitions, young adult chimpanzees are
10–19 and old chimpanzees, 20 and older. Young women are 20–39
and old women, 40 and older. Assuming that the life tables character-
ize stationary populations, the ratio of old adults to young adults is 1.09
for chimpanzees and 1.12 for people, very similar proportions of old
adults in two species with different longevities.
Adding macaques underlines the point. For Smith, Crummett, and
Brandt’s (1994) sample of Macaca fuscata (n = 570), the central ten-
dency of third molar eruption is 5.7 years. By Caspari and Lee’s defin-
ition, young adults would be 5–9 and old adults, 10 and older. Using
Pavelka and Fedigan’s (1999) life table for M. fuscata at Arashiyama
West and again assuming that the population is stationary, the ratio of
old adults to young adults is 0.97. For people, chimpanzees, and
Japanese macaques—species with widely differing longevities—the
ratio of old to young adults is very similar because the definition of old
is scaled to age at maturity.
Konigsberg and Herrmann (chapter 9, this volume) point out
other reasons to be cautious about Caspari and Lee’s analyses. Their
chapter illustrates some of the increasingly sophisticated methods for
dealing with the multiple and inevitable sources of error in estimating
the age characteristics of death assemblages. Difficulties confronting
paleodemographers are daunting but increasingly well recognized.
Some, at least, can be corrected so that this line of hard evidence may
begin to return solid findings.
More investigation of the similarities and differences among living
species will improve understanding of the evolution of our post-
menopausal longevity. For example, chimpanzees in the wild rarely 
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live to menopausal ages. This mortality pattern, as well as numerous
anecdotal descriptions of chimpanzees beginning to display geriatric
symptoms in their mid-30s (Goodall 1986; Huffman 1990; Finch and
Stanford 2004), supports the expectation that chimpanzees age faster
than people do. In captivity, survival improves at all ages (Courtenay
and Santow 1989; Dyke et al. 1995; Hill et al. 2001), so more will live to
menopause. As increasing numbers of captives of known birth dates
move into the ages of interest (Erwin et al. 2002), we have the oppor-
tunity to record variation in ages at menopause and to measure per-
formance of other physiological systems across these ages. Systematic
comparisons between humans and chimpanzees should show which
functions decline with age at a slower rate in our own species.
Weaning before Independent Feeding
Humans wean infants earlier than they can feed themselves and 
at younger ages than chimpanzees or orangutans do (Robson, van
Schaik, and Hawkes, chapter 2, and Sellen, chapter 6, this volume).
This relatively early weaning runs counter to the broad pattern across
primate species, in which longer adult lifespans and later ages at 
first birth are usually associated with later weaning ages (Smith and
Tompkins 1995; Hawkes et al. 1998; Hawkes, O’Connell, and Blurton
Jones 2003; Hawkes, chapter 4, this volume). Variation in rates of mat-
uration to feeding independence has been a topic of special interest in
primate life history evolution beginning with Schultz’s use of dental
markers to identify and compare aspects of primate ontogeny. Schultz
(1960:11–13) wrote: “Of the many age changes in development, those
regarding the dentition have been studied most intensively, not only
because they can be readily observed but also because they serve gen-
erally for the estimation of the physiological age of living animals as
well as skulls.”
In particular, Gould (1977) mentioned Schultz’s (1949) observa-
tion that in faster-maturing primates the molars appear before the
deciduous teeth are shed, so when nursing ends, the molars are ready
for mastication. By contrast, in humans the molars emerge after the
anterior permanent teeth. Gould (1977:380) cited, in full, Schultz’s
interpretation that “this alteration is an adaptive requirement of
delayed development.” Schultz (1950:440) wrote:
It is tempting to speculate that this human distinction is the
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result of some natural selection, directly connected with the
extreme prolongation of the period of growth in man. The
deciduous teeth of man are not more durable than those of
other primates, yet they have to serve in the former for
much longer periods than in the latter. Hence this newly
acquired precedence for the replacement of milk teeth over
the addition of molars is undoubtedly beneficial, if not nec-
essary, for man.
B. H. Smith (2000) has called this “Schultz’s rule” and has used the
differences that Schultz described in the dental emergence patterns of
great apes and humans to assess the relative development of juvenile
hominid fossils (B. H. Smith 1986). In Schultz’s schematic depiction of
variation in duration of life periods across the primates (for example,
Schultz 1960, 1969), he used “the appearance of the first permanent
teeth” to mark the termination of infancy (1969:147). Although we
wean infants earlier, the eruption of the first permanent molars is
much delayed in humans, compared with the living great apes (Robson,
van Schaik, and Hawkes, chapter 2, this volume). Smith showed that
juvenile A. afarensis, A. africanus, and H. habilis specimens fit pongid
emergence standards better than human standards whereas a
Neanderthal specimen fit the modern human pattern. Noting that
“prolonged infant and child dependency appears consistently in theo-
ries of early cultural evolution,” she concluded that her analysis did not
support A. Mann’s (1975) view that this was characteristic of hominids
before the appearance of Homo erectus (B. H. Smith 1986:329).
Smith then investigated relationships between aspects of dental
development and life history variables in a sample of twenty-one pri-
mate species (including prosimians and both New and Old World
anthropoids) to build on Sacher’s finding that brain size, longevity,
and age at maturity are correlated across the mammals (B. H. Smith
1989a). She found that the ages of eruption of the first molar and of
the last permanent teeth were especially well correlated with brain size,
as well as with life history variables such as age at weaning, age at first
birth, and lifespan. “The dentition has advantages over other markers
of maturation in that it is robust to environmental perturbations 
and has relatively low variance. Thus the dentition provides a growth
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marker that is reliable…[and] can be extended to species in the fossil
record” (B. H. Smith 1989a:686).
Smith used these associations, especially age of emergence of the
first molar, to interpret hominin schedules of development, conclud-
ing that australopiths displayed maturation rates like modern apes
whereas Homo erectus and Neanderthals had rates more similar to 
modern humans (B. H. Smith 1989b, 1991a, 1993, 1994; Smith and
Tompkins 1995; Bogin and Smith 1996). Her findings then guided oth-
ers seeking to explain the evolution of human life histories (Bogin
1999a; O’Connell, Hawkes, and Blurton Jones 1999; Kaplan et al. 2000;
Hawkes, O’Connell, and Blurton Jones 2003).
Dental markers do not, however, escape the difficulties with other
growth and development variables discussed under heterochrony
above. Gould (1977) had used Mann’s (1975) assessment that aus-
tralopithecine juveniles had dental developmental patterns like mod-
ern humans and unlike modern apes as evidence of greater
retardation in our lineage from its initial radiation. Smith’s analyses
challenged Mann’s conclusions by showing that the relative timing of
first molar eruption in australopiths was similar to modern apes and
unlike modern humans. Only fossil specimens assigned to genus Homo
displayed emergence sequences similar to modern humans (B. H.
Smith 1994). Other aspects of dental development, however, do not
show the same differences, so specialists have found the emphasis on
first molar eruption difficult to justify (Macho and Wood 1995b).
Macho (2001:189) wrote:
The pattern and timing of tooth emergence is highly corre-
lated with life-history variables and brain size. Conversely, a
firm relationship between molar formation time and life-his-
tory variables has not yet been established. It seems counter-
intuitive that one aspect of dental development should be
correlated with life history variables while the other should
not.
Schultz had made the point that, compared with other modern
primates, some aspects of skeletal development are slowed down in
humans and others are not. The same holds for dental development.
Crown formation is a variable of special interest because the process is
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punctuated by daily shifts that leave a record of the number of days it
takes a tooth to form. Tooth microstructure thus provides an actual
developmental clock for aging juvenile fossils (Beynon and Dean 1988)
and perhaps for identifying absolute weaning ages (Katzenberg,
Herring, and Saunders 1996; Wright and Schwarcz 1998; Rabb et al.
2004). Macho and Wood (1995b:23) report crown formation data for
humans, chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and two fossil hominins:
“[A]vailable data on permanent incisor formation times indicate…
considerable overlap among great apes and humans.… Canine forma-
tion times vary substantially both within and between species.… On the
other hand crown formation times of molars are more similar between
hominoid species.”
With a phylogenetically wider sample of living and extinct primates
covering a broader range of body sizes, Macho (2001) found correla-
tions of crown formation times with life history variables and with brain
size as well. But “the correlations are relatively high for only a few vari-
ables, notably age at weaning, brain size and body mass” (Macho 2001:
196). Considering only her subsample of humans, chimpanzees, goril-
las, and orangutans, even these variables are not correlated with molar
crown formation times (Robson, van Schaik, and Hawkes, chapter 2,
this volume).
Examining a sample of modern humans and fossil relatives and
African apes, Dean and others (2001) found enamel formation rates 
to be faster in anterior teeth of australopiths than in African apes.
Although they confirm Smith’s picture of eruption sequences in genus
Homo, commenting that “radiographs, as well as direct observations of
developing teeth, show that the sequence of key events during tooth
growth in H. erectus was identical to that of modern humans” (Dean et al.
2001:629), they found enamel formation times for two H. erectus speci-
mens to be faster than times for modern humans. Their analysis of
crown formation rates found that only a Neanderthal specimen over-
lapped the modern human range (Dean et al. 2001). In a larger sample
of Neanderthal anterior teeth and measuring a different feature of
enamel formation, Ramírez Rozzi and Bermúdez de Castro (2004)
found clearly faster formation in Neanderthals than in modern 
humans. From this, they infer a faster rate of maturation in Nean-
derthals “because dental growth is an excellent indicator of somatic
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development” (Ramírez Rozzi and Bermúdez de Castro 2004: 936). But
this component of dental development, crown formation times, is not
related to differences in age at maturity among living people and other
great apes.
Other aspects of dental development and life history variation
across primates have been explored by Godfrey and colleagues (2001).
They measured dental development in two ways: (1) dental precocity,
the fraction of postcanine teeth erupted at various ages, and (2) den-
tal endowment at weaning, the fraction of adult postcanine occlusial
area that was present at weaning. A strong association between these
measures and adult brain size, but not a close correlation with life his-
tory traits, led them to “underscore just how variable dental develop-
ment at weaning can be. One cannot assume…that dental maturation
will be linked in a consistent manner to skeletal growth or reproduc-
tive maturation” (Godfrey et al. 2003:197). The details of particular
measures, samples, and tests in these important challenges merit care-
ful attention.
As shown by Robson, van Schaik, and Hawkes (chapter 2, this vol-
ume), commonly used markers of dental development are not correlat-
ed with weaning age across the living hominoids. Weaning does,
however, leave an isotope signature in the microstructure of tooth enam-
el (Katzenberg, Herring, and Saunders 1996; Wright and Schwarcz 1998;
Rabb et al. 2004). That could provide a way to identify this important life
history variable (see Sellen, chapter 6, this volume) in fossil specimens.
D I F F E R E N T  K I N D S  O F  E X P L A N AT I O N S  B E F O R E  A N D
A F T E R  G E N O M I C S
Finding systematic relationships between life history features and
variables that can be measured in bones and teeth is a necessary foun-
dation for extracting life history information from the fossil record.
Different frameworks of ideas have motivated that inquiry and will
surely continue to do so in the future. Distinction between the proxi-
mate mechanisms that generate a morphological, physiological, or
behavioral feature and the adaptive effects that explain why selection
favored, spread, and maintained it goes back to Darwin. The apparent
simplicity of this distinction seems increasingly deceptive, but that does
not make it less important.
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Causal Mechanisms, Adaptive Explanations, and Distinctions
between Homology and Homoplasy
N. Tinbergen (1963) famously reminded evolutionary biologists
that answers to proximate mechanism questions are not answers to
questions about adaptive function, and vice versa. Different kinds of
research programs, different data, different hypotheses address these
different questions. Tinbergen distinguished four different questions
researchers have in mind when they seek to explain a biological fea-
ture, four different “whys.” One addresses the proximate mechanisms
that cause the feature, how the underlying physiology works. This con-
trasts with functional questions that focus on adaptive effects, asking
why selection maintains the feature of interest in the form observed.
Perhaps paradoxically in this context, Tinbergen also distinguished
both of those from questions about ontogeny or phylogeny. A different
research agenda is necessary to discover how a feature develops over
the life course of an individual organism, and another to determine
when the feature arose in ancestral populations. Both mechanism and
adaptive effect questions can also be asked about ontogenetic or phy-
logenetic patterns.
In the past few decades, the dominance of cladistics (Hennig
1966), the explosion of molecular techniques and data sets (Hillis
1994; Klein and Takahata 2002), and the addition to the comparative
method of systematic procedures to correct phylogenetic sampling
biases (Harvey and Pagel 1991) have highlighted new complications
associated with the distinction between causal mechanisms and adap-
tive effects. On the one hand, cladistic methods assume that only simi-
larities between taxa that are shared with their last common ancestor
(homologies) are relevant to identifying phylogenetic relationships.
Similarities between taxa that are not shared with their last common
ancestor (homoplasies) are considered potentially misleading for phy-
logenetic questions.
On the other hand, current practice in testing adaptive hypotheses
with cross-species comparisons requires the use of phylogenetically cor-
rected data sets in which species that are homologous for the features
of interest are not counted because they are not considered indepen-
dent cases. Only homoplasies offer independent trials for testing adap-
tive hypotheses. Classic persuasive illustrations of the power of natural
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selection show different proximate mechanisms producing similar
adaptive effects, for example, adaptations for flight in birds and bats,
male and female individuals produced by diverse sex-determining
mechanisms, and the convergent evolution of cephalopod and verte-
brate eyes.
The distinction between homologous and homoplastic similarities
can seem straightforward, but it has become increasingly vexed as phy-
logenetic relationships are explored in light of evidence of similarities
and differences at many levels. Wake (1999:30–31) gives the following
example:
The condition of permanent larvae in salamanders has
arisen many times independently…some bones never form
in larvae, but even should a permanently larval species
reproduce, the bones remain as latent elements. Imagine
that [these bones] reappear in a derivative species. These
would be identified as homoplasies…in phylogentic analy-
sis, but a morphologist would insist that [each bone is the
same] as in distantly related salamanders. It must be a
homologue!
Lockwood and Fleagle (1999), reviewing treatments of homoplasy
in primate and human evolution, noted that ideas about intrinsic pro-
gressive tendencies supported early twentieth-century expectations of
widespread homoplasies in primate lineages because each lineage was
expected to progress through time from lower to higher grades. After
the modern synthesis, orthogenesis was abandoned, but not the idea of
adaptive trends recognized as grade shifts progressively evolving more
humanlike characteristics. As the primate fossil record expanded, how-
ever, “emphasis was placed on identifying unique features of modern
taxa in fossils, without undue concern for the implications this may
have for parallel evolution or reversals in other features” (Lockwood
and Fleagle 1999:194).
With the expansion of cladistics into anthropology, “homoplasy
was generally seen [at first] as the result of error due to bad choice of
characters and misidentified homology. However, the ‘reality’ of homo-
plasy can be seen in the effect that fossil discoveries have had on phy-
logenies in recent years” (Lockwood and Fleagle 1999:194).
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[It] has become common for fossil taxa to be found that
belong to a particular clade based on selected data sets or
traditional “key” characters, but at the same time reveal par-
allel evolution among various other traits.… In other words,
the combination of traits in the fossil taxon sets up a situa-
tion where one body of evidence (e.g., cranial, dental, or
postcranial) is substantially homoplastic, and it is unclear
which data set to prefer.… Computer programs that are now
available permit analyses of large data sets (numbers of taxa
and characters) that often generate numerous equally parsi-
monious trees. (Lockwood and Fleagle 1999:196)
Unusual features of the primate fossil record, or of the features
often chosen, might make anthropological cladistics especially thorny.
But “statistics…are readily calculated to express the proportion of
character change that reflects homology or homoplasy.… Primates do
not exhibit unusually high or low levels of homoplasy, and within pri-
mates, no single type of data appears to be less homoplastic than other
types of data” (Lockwood and Fleagle 1999:196).
The problem is central for establishing phylogentic relationships,
but it also plagues phenotypic reconstructions. Life history models
show why, given stable population theory and assuming populations to
be generally nongrowing, only certain combinations of life history
traits can persist—but which, if any, features of the fossil specimens
provide reliable signals of any of them?
After the Genomics Revolution
Problems of the homology/homoplasy opposition have emerged
with special force from discoveries in evolutionary developmental
genetics. The complexities apply not only to morphological and behav-
ioral data sets but to molecular ones as well (Sanderson and Donoghue
1989; Patterson, Williams, and Humphries 1993). In light of “evo-devo”
findings, Gould (2002:1062) appraised his treatment in Ontogeny and
Phylogeny as reading
like a quaint conceptual fossil from an “ancient” time of
cross bows and arquebuses.… I can only express my joy and
astonishment at a subsequent speed of resolution and dis-
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covery that has sustained my predictions, but also made my
earlier book effectively obsolete…the field of evolutionary
developmental biology…has invented the tools…for decod-
ing the basic genetic structure of regulation.
Because “extensive genetic homology for fundamental features of
development does hold across the most disparate animal phyla”
(Gould 2002:1066), Gould (1123) concluded that evo-devo has finally
laid “selectionist orthodoxy” to rest:
This general shift in viewpoint—from a preference for
atomistic adaptationism (favoring the explanation for each
part as an independent and relatively unconstrained event
of crafting by natural selection for current utility) to a recog-
nition that homologous developmental pathways (retained
from a deep and different past, whatever the original adap-
tive context) strongly shape current possibilities “from the
inside”—has permeated phylogentic studies at all levels,
from similarities among the most disparate phyla to diversity
among species within small monophyletic segments of life’s
tree.
Gould (1123) summarizes “the homology of developmental path-
ways in homoplastic eyes of several phyla” to demonstrate that selec-
tion is subordinate to developmental mechanisms. However, the
findings also highlight the power of natural selection. Reviewing the
book, D. Futuyma (2002:661) wrote that “Gould’s excitement (which I
share) about contemporary ‘evo-devo’ is palpable.… (I, however, do
not agree that the convergence of vertebrate and cephalopod eyes, in
which some ‘master’ genes play common roles, has lost its role as tes-
tament to the power of natural selection).” Patterns of growth and
development vary among closely related taxa with different elements
of that variation uncoupled from one another, while the same genetic
control mechanisms are found among taxa not only in different phyla
but in different kingdoms.
“The more we learn about the genome, the more it teaches
us about our own place in the web of life,” said Robert May ,
an evolutionary biologist and president of the Royal Society
in Great Britain. “For example, we share half our genes with
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the banana. (Actually, it would be more accurate to say
bananas share half their genes with us, because their
genome is smaller.) This is a fact more evident in some of my
acquaintances than others.” (Discover 2001:62)
The genomics revolution has provided a radically new view of the
diversity of life (for example, Adoutte et al. 2000), to which phenotypic
characteristics can be a poor guide. J. Klein and N. Takahata’s (2002:
199) comments capture a “post genomics” view of human/chimpanzee
comparisons:
All the estimates obtained by both older and newer tech-
niques have yielded very similar figures: the genomes of
these two species differ at approximately 1–2 percent of
their nucleotide sites.… Science writers and even some sci-
entists appear to be flabbergasted when confronted with the
sequence divergence between the human and chimpanzee
genomes, but they shouldn’t be, because the observed value
matches the expectation very well. It would be indeed
astounding if the value had turned out to be much greater
than 2 percent.
They suggest that “the impression of a gap between the small differ-
ences at the molecular level to the seemingly large differences at the
phenotypic level may arise because the intervening steps between the
genotype and the phenotype, between the DNA and the appearance of
an organism, remain unidentified” (Klein and Takahata 2002:204).
The difference between people and chimpanzees also seems
remarkable because of the tendency to misestimate the rate of change
required to produce the phenotypic differences. As G. C. Williams
(1992:132) pointed out:
Data on Pleistocene human evolution are interpretable in
various ways, but it is possible that the cerebrum doubled in
size in as little as 100,000 years, or perhaps 3000 generations
(Rightmire 1985). This according to Whiten and Byrne
(1988) is a “unique and staggering acceleration in brain
size.” How rapid a rate is this really? Even with conservative
assumptions on coefficient of variation (e.g., 10%) and her-
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itability (30%) in this character, it would take only a rather
weak selection (s = 0.03) to give a 1% change in a genera-
tion. This would mean a doubling in 70 generations. An
early hominid brain could have increased to modern size,
and back again, about 21 times while the actual evolution
took place.
Thirty years ago, King and Wilson (1975) surmised that differences
in regulatory mechanisms mostly account for the phenotypic differ-
ences between people and chimpanzees. This hypothesis continues to
be a useful guide as new technology allows much more precise com-
parison of genomes. The two species differ in levels of gene expression,
the location of recombination “hot spots,” and the evident strength of
selection on particular genes (Enard et al. 2002; Caceres et al. 2003;
Olson and Varki 2004; Nielsen et al. 2005; Winckler et al. 2005). Inser-
tions, deletions, and duplications account for more differences than 
single nucleotide substitutions (Cheng et al. 2005; The Chimpanzee
Sequencing and Analysis Consortium 2005).
One genomic signal of the differences in life history is revealed by
analyses of changes in gene expression with age in human and chim-
panzee brains (Fraser et al. 2005). Now the power of molecular tech-
niques to measure both similarities and differences far outstrips
understanding of their phenotypic consequences. Positive selection
can be detected in the absence of clues about the actual fitness costs
and benefits conferred. The challenge is to link the evidence of selec-
tion to phenotypic consequences (Li and Saunders 2005). As S. B.
Carroll (2005:1164) noted in an Allan Wilson Memorial Lecture, “the
great and difficult challenge, with the genome sequences of humans,
chimpanzees, and other mammals now available, is to map changes in
genes to changes in traits.”
Study of genetic correlations with intraspecific variation in aging
rates among humans and among chimpanzees will also provide more
evidence of how rates of aging shifted in our lineage. Genetic diversity
in living human populations may even contain evidence of differences
among nonmodern populations (Eswaran, Harpending, and Rogers
2005). For the most part, however, learning about the phenotypes of
our ancestors and extinct cousins necessarily remains the “ancient”
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problem that Gould laid out in 1977: “The data of heterochrony rep-
resent the only confident estimate that classical macroevolutionary
morphology can supply for the importance of changes in regulation”
(Gould 1977:408). It is the fossil and archaeological record that can
show where and when brains, bodies, and life histories changed in the
hominin clade. Discovering what the lives of the ancestors and cousins
of modern humans were like, how they differed from us and from
other modern primates, how they differed from one another, what
happened in our lineage before the appearance of modern humans,
where, when, and why, requires placing the fossil and archaeological
clues within frameworks for describing and explaining the variation we
can examine in living species. To discover what phenotypes selection
favored and when and why, we need well-warranted hypotheses about
the variation in the present and also ways to take those hypotheses to
the tangible remains of a different past.
A D A P T I V E  H Y P O T H E S E S  A B O U T  T H E  E V O L U T I O N
O F  H U M A N  L I F E  H I S T O R I E S
Gould in 1977 had expected morphological variation to be mosaic
because “the evolutionary direction of each feature is controlled by nat-
ural selection; the capacity for independent variation of characteristics
is very great” (Gould 1977:364–365). He had also cited Cole’s (1954)
demonstration that life history features cannot vary independently.
Subsequent work on evolution in age-structured populations has elabo-
rated both the theory and the empirical record on relationships among
age at maturity, annual fecundity, and adult and juvenile mortality. The
life history models do not depend on particular mechanisms, applying
as they do across species in which those mechanisms might (or might
not) be different. That gives them a welcome generality for applications
to a different past. At the same time, the estimates of life history vari-
ables in past populations must come from fossil evidence, so lineage-
specific mechanisms that link morphological features to life history
variables in primates—size and aspects of dental development, for
example—become crucial tools. Genomics promises to add to this a
much better understanding of what changed in the evolution of our
own lineage and that of our sister species, chimpanzees. The fossil and
archaeological records tie those changes to time and place, and a life
HAW K E S
90 www.sarpress.org                        Copyrighted Material
history framework supplies the help of linking features to one another.
When some life history traits can be confidently estimated, the result 
is a strong prediction about others. Explicit attempts to take advantage
of those interrelationships in constructing and revising adaptive
hypotheses are recent, but they build on a venerable foundation.
In the fifties and sixties, S. L. Washburn departed from most
anthropologists in arguing that comparative morphology supported a
quite recent common ancestor of modern humans and African apes,
something the molecular evidence subsequently confirmed (Goodman
1962; Wilson and Sarich 1969; King and Wilson 1975). As Lockwood
and Fleagle (1999:195) noted, Washburn and his students repeatedly
pointed out that the “fossil phylogenies based on dental similarities
[like tooth size] between particular ‘Miocene apes’ and living homi-
noid genera implied tremendous parallel evolution of postcranial 
similarities among modern hominoids.” Contrary to many anthropolo-
gists, Washburn preferred a “more parsimonious phylogeny: a clade of
Miocene apes preceding the radiation of living hominoids. This view in
many ways laid the groundwork for current understanding of fossil
hominoid relationships” (Lockwood and Fleagle 1999:195).
Washburn had the widest influence on thinking about human evo-
lution through his elaboration of the Hunting hypothesis. Its satisfying,
adaptive logic is one of the reasons it is so widely enlisted to explain
human evolution. His emphasis was on links among hunting, tools,
bipedalism, and brains, but he used these to explain what Gould called
the “hallmarks of hominization.” Building on Dart’s (1949) savanna
hypothesis about the likely importance of hunting and therefore tools
and brains to explain the bipedalism of australopithecines, Washburn
(1960) proposed that the combination of enlarging brains and a pelvis
shaped for bipedalism created an “obstetrical dilemma” for mothers.
Shifts in the timing and rate of fetal, infant, and juvenile development
were necessary consequences. Most brain growth had to be postnatal,
slowing other aspects of infant development. Undeveloped neonates
required more maternal protection and support, and juveniles needed
a longer developmental and learning period before reaching adulthood.
The conflict between maternal care requirements and hunting led
mothers to pair with hunting mates who supplied paternal provisioning
to fund the greater dependence of human infants and juveniles for a
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longer time. A sexual division of labor with paternal provisioning made
nuclear families into units of economic and reproductive cooperation.
Gould (1977:400) mentioned Washburn as one who had recognized
the significance of delayed maturation. But Washburn did more than
that. He elaborated an adaptive hypothesis that linked slow develop-
ment to the fitness benefits for an ape that could eat better by hunting
in savanna environments (Washburn 1960; Washburn and Lancaster
1968; Washburn and Moore 1974).
Washburn drew comprehensively on hominid fossils, Paleolithic
archaeology, comparative studies of nonhuman primates, and studies
of modern hunter-gatherers. He used the consensus picture that had
emerged in each of these fields through the sixties and early seventies
to fill out the scenario. Ethnology gave a fundamental role to sexual
divisions of labor, making nuclear families the basic elements of
human social organization (for example, Murdock 1949; Sahlins
1972). Other primates generally, and other great apes in particular,
lacked nuclear families and were not known to hunt (Lancaster and
Lancaster 1983). The paleontological record suggested that bipedal
locomotion and enlarged brains emerged contemporaneously, and
this appeared to be more or less coincident in time with the earliest
archaeology (Washburn 1960).
Challenges began to mount in the late seventies, with clear evi-
dence that bipedalism preceded the appearance of stone tools and
expanding brains by at least a million years (Johanson and White 1979;
see Skinner and Wood, chapter 11, this volume). Chimpanzees were
discovered to be regular hunters (Goodall 1968, 1986; Stanford 1999).
The home base interpretation of concentrations of stone tools and the
bones of large animals in Lower Paleolithic sites was critically ques-
tioned and largely rejected (Binford 1981; O’Connell, Hawkes, and
Blurton Jones 1988; O’Connell et al. 2002). Archaeologists now recog-
nize that clear evidence of hominin big-game hunting does not appear
until the late Middle Pleistocene, more than 1.5 million years after the
earliest stone tools and at least a million years after the appearance of
genus Homo (O’Connell et al. 2002; Stiner 2002). Systematic study of
foraging and food-sharing patterns among living hunter-gatherers
showed that hunters provide little of the meat eaten by their own wives
and offspring; most is eaten by consumers outside the hunter’s own
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family (Kaplan and Hill 1985; Hawkes, O’Connell, and Blurton Jones
1991, 2001b; Hawkes 1993).
Some view the challenges as decisive grounds for rejecting the
Hunting hypothesis (for example, Zihlmann and Tanner 1978;
Dahlberg 1981; O’Connell, Hawkes, and Blurton Jones 1999; Hawkes,
O’Connell, and Blurton Jones 2001a; O’Connell et al. 2002). Others
argue that the Hunting hypothesis still captures major components of
what happened in human evolution (Tooby and DeVore 1987; Deacon
1997; Kaplan et al. 2000). Adaptive hypotheses about the evolution of
human life histories that are founded on these alternative assessments
are discussed in chapter 4.
A lesson of this review is that what we know about the past is much
more complicated than it used to be. Each line of inquiry develops
conceptual and modeling tools and bodies of evidence that highlight
different questions, driving what practitioners investigate, what they
debate, and what they take for granted. That is supposed to be how
knowledge increases. But the difficulty of conversation across lines of
evidence grows as a consequence, and notions falsified in one field of
inquiry remain common assumptions in others. Some things that seem
contradictory may be what we should expect of a different past, as
Gould anticipated in 1977 about heterochronic changes in human evo-
lution. The problem of discovering which aspects of the fossil and
archaeological record give the best indices of ancestral life history vari-
ables has no clear general solution, at least not yet. Alternative
hypotheses applied to multiple lines of evidence expose many contra-
dictions and pose new measurement and modeling challenges. The
one certain thing is that recent developments give us all a lot to do.
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